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One of the main uses of logic in computer science is in verification, that is, specifying properties of systems (I use the term generally), and proving that systems satisfy those properties. A quick survey of the verification literature reveals two popular approaches.
The first approach relies on a logic in which to express properties of systems, and on the definition of a satisfaction relation to prescribe when a formula of the logic is true of a system. One can then develop techniques such as model checking or theorem proving for establishing that a property is true of a system. Let me call this approach logical verification.
The second approach is based on the following observation: to verify that a system has a particular property, it suffices to show the system equivalent to another system that obviously has the desired property. The technical meat of such an approach consists in defining suitable notions of equivalence, establishing that equivalence preserves the properties of interest, and developing techniques for proving the equivalence of two systems. Such techniques generally involve manipulating equations involving equivalence between systems. Accordingly, let me call this approach equational verification.
The distinction between logical verification and equational verification is not a new one. One finds early discussions of a similar distinction in the distributed computing literature. The transition axiom method of Lamport [1983] , essentially a form of equational verification, was admittedly developed to compensate for perceived insufficiencies in logical verification based on temporal logic (when used to specify properties of distributed systems). I find it interesting that the distinction occurs in so many places in the literature, in many different fields. The purpose of this article is to illustrate the distinction and examine the two approaches in a number of simple settings where their relationship is particularly easy to describe, and hopefully to wet your appetite and let you investigate other areas where the distinction between logical verification and equational verification arises.
Processes
Process calculi emerged from the work of Hoare [1985] and Milner [1980] on models of concurrency, and are meant to model systems made up of processes communicating by exchanging values across channels. They allow for the dynamic creation and removal of processes, allowing the modeling of dynamic systems. A typical process calculus is CCS [Milner 1980; Milner 1989] , which is the foundation of a number of more involved calculi.
CCS provides a minimalist syntax for writing processes. Processes perform actions, which can be of three forms: the sending of a message over channel x (written x), the receiving of a message over channel x (written x), and internal actions (written τ ), the details of which are unobservable. 1 Send and receive actions are called synchronization actions, since communication occurs when the corresponding processes synchronize. Let α stand for actions, including the internal action τ , while λ is reserved for synchronization actions. The syntax of CCS processes is given by the following grammar:
We write 0 for the empty sum (when n = 0). The process 0 represents the process that does nothing and simply terminates. A process of the form λ.P awaits to synchronize with a process of the form λ.Q, after which the processes continue as process P and Q respectively. A generalization of such processes is α 1 .P 1 + · · · + α n .P n , which nondeterministically synchronizes via a single α i . To combine processes, the parallel composition P 1 |P 2 is used. The difference between sum and parallel composition is that a sum offers a choice, so only one of the summands can synchronize and proceed, while a parallel composition allows all its component processes to proceed. The process νx.P defines a local channel name x to be used within process P . This name is guaranteed to be unique to P (possibly through consistent renaming).
As an example, consider the process (x.y.0 + x.z.0)|x.0|y.0. Intuitively, it consists of three processes running in parallel: the first offers of choice of either receiving over channel x, or sending over channel x, the second sends over channel x, and the third sends over channel y. Depending on which choice the first process performs (as we will see, this depends on the actions the other process can perform), it can continue in one of two ways: if it chooses to receive on channel x (i.e., the x.y.0 summand is chosen), it can then receive on channel y, while if it chooses to send on x (i.e., the x.z.0 summand is chosen), it can then receive on channel z.
To represent the execution of a process, we define the notion of a transition. Intuitively, the transition relation tells us how to perform one step of execution of the process. Note that since there can be many ways in which a process executes, the transition is fundamentally nondeterministic. The transition of a process P into a process Q by performing an action α is indicated P α −→ Q.
1 In the literature, the actions of CCS are often given a much more abstract interpretation, as simply names and co-names. The send/receive interpretation is useful for being easy to grasp.
The action α is the observation of the transition. The transition relation is defined by the following inference rules: That is, the process reduces to y.0|0|y.0 in one step that does not provide outside information, since it appears as an internal action. (The 0 can be removed from the resulting process, as it does not contribute further to the execution of the process, although there is an argument that goes here and that I am shamelessly sweeping under the rug.). The resulting process y.0|y.0 can then perform a further transition, derived as follows: A logic for reasoning about CCS processes was introduced by Hennessy and Milner [1985] , called simply Hennessy-Milner logic, or HML. The syntax of HML formulas is given by the following grammar:
Formulas describe properties of processes. The formula true represents the formula which is true of every process. The formula ¬ϕ is the negation of ϕ, while ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 is the conjunction of ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 . The formula [α]ϕ, where α is an action (possibly τ ), intuitively says that for all ways that a process can perform action α, it transitions to a process for which ϕ is true. We define the disjunction ϕ 1 ∨ ϕ 2 as an abbreviation for ¬(¬ϕ 1 ∧ ¬ϕ 2 ) and the implication ϕ 1 ⇒ ϕ 2 as an abbreviation for ¬ϕ 1 ∨ ϕ 2 . Following the intuitions outlined above, we can formally define what it means for a formula ϕ to be true for process P , written P |= ϕ, by induction on the structure of ϕ:
Instead of using a logic such as HML, a popular way of reasoning about processes is to consider a definition of equivalence between processes, and reason equationally about the equivalence of a process with an "ideal" process that represents the correct desired behavior. One standard notion of equivalence between processes is to take two processes as equivalent if they are indistinguishable from the point of view of an external observer interacting with the processes. A particular formalization of such an equivalence is strong bisimilarity [Milner 1980] . A strong bisimulation is a relation R such that whenever (P, Q) ∈ R, we have:
We say P and Q are strongly bisimilar, written P ∼ Q, if there exists a strong bisimulation R such that (P, Q) ∈ R. In other words, if P and Q are strongly bisimilar, then whatever transition P can take, Q can match it with one of his own that results in processes that are themselves strongly bisimilar, and vice versa. It is easy to check that ∼ is an equivalence relation.
The following result of Hennessy and Milner [1985] highlights the deep relationship between logical verification using HML and equational verification using strong bisimilarity. Based on this observation, we can associate with a process Q (when viewed as a specification) the set of HML formulas that Q satisfies, [[Q] ] {ϕ | Q |= ϕ}. A simple recasting of Proposition 1 gives:
Proposition 2. The following are equivalent:
Thus, a process P is strongly bisimilar to a "specification process" Q if it satisfies exactly the formulas [[Q] ] associated with Q. In this sense, we can understand strong bisimilarity as checking that a particular class of formulas holds of a process.
Similar results can be obtained for different notions of equivalence. Strong bisimilarity is a very fine equivalence relation; not many processes end up being equivalent. More worryingly, strong bisimilarity does not handle internal actions very well. Intuitively, process equivalence should really only involve observable actions. Two processes that only perform internal actions should be considered equivalent. For instance, the processes τ.τ.0 and τ.0 should really be considered equivalent, as they really do nothing after performing some internal (and hence really unobservable) actions. Unfortunately, it is easy to check that these two processes are not strongly bisimilar. To ACM SIGACT News address this situation, a weaker notion of equivalence, weak bisimilarity, is often used in practice. It is easy to extend HML to deal with this form of equivalence, by introducing suitable modal operators. In a similar way, we can extend HML to express recursive properties; this leads quickly the propositional modal µ-calculus [Kozen 1983 ]. For much more along those lines, see the excellent monograph of Stirling [2001] . Furthermore, we can play this game of logical and equational verification for processes in the context of the π calculus, which extends CCS with the capability to send values over channels [Milner 1999 ]. An extension of HML capturing some forms of equivalence for the π calculus is given by Milner, Parrow, and Walker [1993] .
Programs
A similar, but slightly more complicated picture, arises for reasoning about programs. To keep things as clear as possible, let me consider a very simple class of programs, regular programs. Start with a set A of primitive programs. We use a to range over primitive programs. Primitive programs are abstract operations we want our programs to perform. The syntax of regular programs is given by the following grammar:
Thus, a primitive program a ∈ A is a regular program. The program α 1 ; α 2 represents the sequencing of programs α 1 and α 2 , while the program α 1 + α 2 represents a nondeterministic choice between programs α 1 and α 2 . The program α * represent the finite iteration of the program α for a nondeterministic number of iterations (possibly none). Of course, the name "regular programs" comes from the fact that we can view such programs as regular expressions. It is well known how to give a semantics to regular programs: we map a program to a relation between initial states and final states. An interpretation for the primitive programs is a map σ that associates to each primitive program a a binary relation σ(a) on the set of states. Intuitively, (s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ σ(a) if executing the primitive program a in state s 1 leads to state s 2 . We give a semantics to arbitrary programs by extending σ inductively to all programs:
For R and S binary relations, we write R • S for the relation {(u, v) | ∃w.(u, w) ∈ R, (w, v) ∈ S}, and R n is defined inductively by taking R 0 to be the identity relation, and R n+1 to be R n • R. The map σ gives us what is commonly called the input-output semantics of programs.
To reason about properties of those programs, we consider a logic called propositional dynamic logic, or PDL [Harel, Kozen, and Tiuryn 2000] . We start with a set Φ 0 of primitive propositions representing basic facts about states. We use p to range over primitive propositions. The syntax of PDL formulas is given by the following grammar:
Thus, a primitive proposition p ∈ Φ 0 is a formula. The formulas ¬ϕ and ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 have their usual reading, while the formula [α]ϕ, where α is a regular program, reads "all halting executions ACM SIGACT News of program α result in a state satisfying ϕ". As in the last section, we define ϕ 1 ∨ ϕ 2 as an abbreviation for ¬(¬ϕ 1 ∧ ¬ϕ 2 ) and ϕ 1 ⇒ ϕ 2 as an abbreviation for ¬ϕ 1 ∨ ϕ 2 . Furthermore, we define ϕ 1 ⇔ ϕ 2 as an abbreviation for (ϕ 1 ⇒ ϕ 2 ) ∧ (ϕ 2 ⇒ ϕ 1 ). We write α ϕ as an abbreviation for ¬[α]¬ϕ; α ϕ reads "at least one halting execution of α results in a state satisfying ϕ".
The semantics of PDL is given using Kripke structures [Kripke 1963 ]. Essentially, a Kripke structure is a set of states; think of all the states a program could be in. Following the formalization above, programs are interpreted as a relation between initial states and final states, and at every state we have an interpretation function telling us what primitive propositions are true at that state. General formulas will express properties of moving through that state space. Formally, a Kripke structure M is a tuple (S, π, σ) where S is a set of states, π is an interpretation function assigning a truth value to each primitive proposition p at each state s (i.e., π(s)(p) ∈ {true, false}) and σ is an interpretation for the primitive programs, as defined earlier. We define what it means for a PDL formula ϕ to be true in state s of M , written (M, s) |= ϕ, by induction on the structure of ϕ:
Thus, a formula [α] ϕ is true at a state s if for all states s ′ that can be reached by executing the program α at state s, ϕ holds. We can verify that α ϕ holds at a state s if and only if there is at least one state that is reachable by program α from state s such that ϕ holds in the state, hence justifying our intuitive reading of α ϕ. If a formula ϕ is true at all the states of a model M , we say that ϕ is valid in M and write M |= ϕ. If a formula ϕ is valid in all models, we say ϕ is valid, and write |= ϕ.
An alternative approach for reasoning about regular programs is to give a direct definition of equivalence between programs, and use equational logic to reason about equivalence of programs. For regular programs, a popular notion of equivalence is obtained by taking two programs to be equivalent if they denote the same input-output relation on states. This kind of equivalence is captured by the theory of Kleene algebras [Conway 1971] . One presentation of this theory is the following axiomatization given by Kozen [1994] :
where 0 and 1 are constants representing respectively the empty program (with no executions) and the identity program (that does not change the state), and x ≤ y if and only if x + y = y.
By general considerations of equational logic, the axioms of Kleene algebra along with the usual axioms for equality, instantiation, as well as rules for introduction and elimination of implications, ACM SIGACT News constitutes a complete deductive system for reasoning about implications in the theory of Kleene algebras [Selman 1972] . 2 The fundamental relationship between equational verification using Kleene algebras and logical verification using PDL is given by the following result, which partly follows from the fact that the relational semantics of programs given above forms a Kleene algebra:
Proposition 3. The following are equivalent:
One distinct advantage with reasoning equationally is that deciding α = β is PSPACE-complete [Stockmeyer and Meyer 1973] , while deciding |= ϕ in PDL is EXPTIME-complete [Fischer and Ladner 1979; Pratt 1978] .
Is there a way to view a program β as a specification against which we can check another program α? Recall what we did for processes in the previous section: a process P was equivalent to a "specification process" Q if P satisfied exactly the HML formulas associated with the specification process Q. Can something similar be done for programs? The answer is yes, and here is a natural way to do it. It relies intrinsically on the relationship between regular expressions and finite automata, which are almost Kripke structures. By associating with a program α a Kripke structure representing that program, we can associate with a "specification program" β the set of PDL formulas that are valid in the Kripke structure representing β. One would then hope that α and β are equivalent (according to the theory of Kleene algebras) when the Kripke structure associated with α satisfies exactly the formulas associated with β. And this is indeed the case. Let me make all of this precise.
First, we need to construct a nondeterministic finite automaton A α corresponding to a program α. There is nothing original here. The trick is to do this in a way that clearly reflects the structure of the program. (Otherwise, we end up pushing much of the equivalence between programs into the construction of the nondeterministic automaton, with the result of potentially begging the question). In other words, we would like syntactically different programs to yield different nondeterministic automata, even when those programs are actually equivalent, such as a and a + a. We can do this most easily in two steps, first by inductively constructing a nondeterministic finite automaton with ǫ-moves (that is, non-action moves that the automaton can perform at any time), second by collapsing the automaton by identifying the states reachable by ǫ-moves, and removing the ǫ-moves. Recall that a nondeterministic finite automaton is a tuple A = (Q, q 0 , Q f , ∆), where Q is the finite set of states, q 0 is the initial state, Q f is a set of final (or accepting) states, and ∆ is a set of transitions, each transition being of the form (q, a, q ′ ) and representing a transition from state q to state q ′ upon action a ∈ A ∪ {ǫ}. Figure 1 summarizes the construction of the nondeterministic finite automaton A α corresponding to program α.
To view a nondeterministic finite automaton as a Kripke structure is straightforward. The states of the automaton are the states of the Kripke structure. We consider only the primitive propositions Φ 0 = {init, final }, where init says that a state is initial, while final says that a state is final. The interpretation of primitive propositions enforces this reading. The interpretation of We first construct the nondeterministic finite automaton with ǫ-moves A ǫ α , by induction on the structure of α:
We derive the nondeterministic finite automaton without ǫ-moves A α by identifying states that are reachable by ǫ-moves. Let A ǫ α = (Q, q 0 , Q f , ∆). Define the following relations on states Q: let q → ǫ q ′ if there exists a sequence of states q 1 = q, q 2 , . . . , primitive programs is given by the transitions in the finite automaton. Formally, if α is a program with A α = (Q, q 0 , Q f , ∆), the Kripke structure M α = (S α , π α , σ α ) corresponding to α is given by:
We can now associate with a program β (when viewed as a specification) the set of formulas of PDL that M β satisfies, [[β]] {ϕ | M β |= ϕ}. The following result follows rather easily from Proposition 3: Of course, this statement is simply restating the well-known fact that two regular expressions are equal (i.e., denote the same language) when their corresponding finite automata recognize the same language.
Let me conclude this section with some comments on PDL. The logic we have used is rather poor, in that it cannot be used to reason about programs with conditional statements. If we add to the syntax of regular programs a class of programs of the form ϕ?, interpreted as "if the current state satisfies ϕ, then continue", we can encode a conditional such as if ϕ then α 1 else α 2 by (ϕ?; α 1 ) + ((¬ϕ)?; α 2 ). This addition makes the syntax of programs and formulas in the logic mutually recursive. It also means that we cannot give the semantics of programs independently of the semantics of the formulas of the logic. With this in mind, we extend σ to tests with respect to a Kripke structure M by taking
If we restrict ϕ? to only use propositional formulas (without occurrences of modal operators [α]ϕ or α ϕ), we get a logic sometimes called poor test PDL. It is possible to reason equationally about programs with poor tests by using a variant of Kleene algebras called Kleene algebras with tests [Kozen 1997 ]. If we allow tests ϕ? to use arbitrary PDL formulas, we get rich test PDL. Rich test PDL is very expressive; it lets us write formulas that include programs such as [α 1 ]ϕ?; α 2 , which says that if all halting executions of α 1 result in a state where ϕ holds, then execute α 2 . It seems counterintuitive for programs to be able to perform speculative execution in that way, especially since such properties tend to be undecidable for reasonable programming language. I know of no equational theory for programs using such strong tests.
Conclusion
As the examples above illustrate, there is often a deep relationship between logical verification and equational verification. One might be left with the impression that such relationships are always present. Unfortunately, the more complex the equivalence, the more difficult it is to capture through a logical specification. Some of the most involved equivalences being applied nowadays occur in cryptography, where a cryptographic scheme is generally proved correct by showing it is equivalent to a simpler scheme which is unimplementable, but more obviously correct (perhaps because it uses a trusted third party, or a perfectly private channel) [Goldreich 1998 ]. A potentially interesting venue for exploring logical characterizations of equivalence for cryptographic schemes is the recent work of Datta et al. [2004] that attempts to relate and unify such equivalences with a notion of equivalence based on a stochastic process calculus [Mitchell, Ramanathan, Scedrov, and Teague 2001] .
Let me close on a remark prompted by my choice of examples. The astute reader will have noticed that HML and PDL have much of the similar flavor. They both use formulas involving actions and their effects. There is a difference, however, in that formulas in PDL describe the actions of a program in a particular environment (given by a state of the corresponding Kripke structure) while formulas in HML describe the actions of the environment on a particular process (given by the process serving as a model). Thus, despite surface similarities, the logics are meant to reason about quite different things, somewhat dual to each other: processes as models and environments in formulas, versus environments as models and programs in formulas. I am curious of the extent to which this duality can be made precise, and whether there are insights to be gained from it.
